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How do presidents and their advisors make war and peace decisions on military intervention, escalation,
deescalation, and termination of conflicts? How do groups make decisions? Why do they often make
suboptimal decisions or appear to be frozen in inaction? The leading concept of group dynamics, Groupthink,
offers one explanation: cohesive policymaking groups, such as advisors to the president, often make suboptimal
decisions due to their desire for uniformity over dissent, while ignoring important limitations of chosen
policies, overestimating the odds for success and failing to consider other relevant policy options or
possibilities. But groups, including presidential advisory teams, are often fragmented and divisive. We thus
introduce Polythink, a group decision-making dynamic whereby different members in a decision-making unit
espouse a plurality of opinions and offer divergent policy prescriptions, which can result in intragroup conflict,
a disjointed decision-making process, and decision paralysis as each group member pushes for his or her
preferred policy action. This phenomenon is no less problematic or common than Groupthink and explains how
otherwise smart, experienced decision-makers can engage in flawed decision-making processes that deeply
affect the security and welfare of a country. By shining a light on Polythink’s symptoms and consequences, and
on the factors that lead to Polythink, we seek to offer actionable policy prescriptions for elite decision-makers
to offset the negative attributes of this phenomenon and engage in more optimal policymaking processes.
Furthermore, we explain how leaders and other decision-makers (e.g., in business) can transform Destructive
Polythink into Productive Polythink, illuminating the potential ways in which this group dynamic may be
effectively directed towards sound decisions.
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How do policymakers make critical policy decisions? Why do smart, experienced decision-
makers often make what appear to be suboptimal choices? How do groups make decisions? The polit-
ical psychology of group decision-making can shed light on these important questions.
Decision-making groups can be placed on a continuum of cohesion from monolithic and unified
to disjointed and fragmented. The location of a decision-making group on this continuum can have a
critical impact on the decision-making process and ultimate policy chosen. Famously demonstrated
by Janis (1972), Groupthink is one potential syndrome of cohesive groups. Under Groupthink, groups
will make suboptimal decisions due to their desire for uniformity over dissent, while ignoring impor-
tant limitations of chosen policies, overestimating the odds for success and failing to consider other
relevant policy options or possibilities.
3
0162-895X VC 2016 International Society of Political Psychology
Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ,
and PO Box 378 Carlton South, 3053 Victoria, Australia
Advances in Political Psychology, Vol. 37, Suppl. 1, 2016
doi: 10.1111/pops.12319
bs_bs_banner
On the other end of the spectrum, groups can be fragmented and divisive. In this contingency,
Polythink is a greater concern. Polythink is a group decision-making dynamic whereby different mem-
bers in a decision-making unit espouse a plurality of opinions and offer divergent policy prescriptions,
which can result in intragroup conflict, a disjointed decision-making process, and decision paralysis
and inaction as each group member pushes for his or her preferred policy action (Mintz, Mishal, &
Morag, 2005; Mintz & Wayne, 2016). In many ways, Polythink describes a fragmented and conflicted
pattern of decision-making in which relevant actors do not have a strong commitment to each other.
Thus, Polythink occurs when there is essentially too much diversity of opinion, rather than too little.
This article will examine Polythink’s symptoms and consequences, as well as the factors that lead to
Polythink in order to offer actionable policy prescriptions for decision-makers to offset the negative
attributes of this phenomenon. We will also introduce the concept of Productive Polythink, which can
lead to more optimal policymaking processes.
Polythink
Polythink exists when a plurality of opinions and views leads to disagreement between group
members. Indeed, Polythink is relevant to any group (not just decision units), including multiple
groups within a decision unit.1 “Polythink” is derived from the word “poly,” meaning “many”
ways of perceiving the same decision problem, important goals, and potential solutions (Mintz
et al., 2005). Thus, necessary conditions for Polythink are the presence of a plurality of opinions
in the group, disagreement, and dissent within the decision unit. Polythink can affect everything
from the identification of policy problems, to the potential options considered to address them, to
the ultimate choice made. Polythink is essentially the opposite of Groupthink on the continuum of
decision-making from “completely cohesive” (Groupthink) to “completely fragmented” (Poly-
think). The divergence of opinions in Polythink groups will frequently lead to myriad opinions,
interpretations of reality, and policy prescriptions, which will make it difficult to formulate cohe-
sive policies.
Polythink thus results from a disjointed decision-making where the level of dissention makes it
difficult, if not impossible, for group members to reach consensus regarding (1) the problem they are
facing and (2) the best solution to the problem. As a result, Polythink can lead to suboptimal decision-
making processes that often result in bad decision outcomes. This dissent can also lead to decision
paralysis, leaving major policy initiatives stymied by discord and inaction. Polythink characterizes
many decision units and contributes to shaping the review of policy options and outcomes. It is thus
likely that groups that are handicapped by Polythink will reach a very different decision than groups
plagued by Groupthink.2
Both Polythink and Groupthink should be considered as “pure” types. In real-world deci-
sion-making situations, there is rarely a case of pure or extreme Polythink or Groupthink. It
is therefore more useful to think of these two concepts as extremes on a continuum in which
“good” decision-making dynamics typically lie towards the middle, whereas defective ones
lean closer to the two extremes—the group conformity of Groupthink or the group disunity
of Polythink (see Figure 1).
1 For example, Dan Caldwell (2011) references Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay’s work in the book America Unbound,
in which they identified three distinct groups within the Bush Administration: assertive nationalists (Dick Cheney,
Donald Rumsfeld), neoconservatives (Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton, Richard Perle), and pragmatic internationalists
(Colin Powell, Richard Haass).
2 This focus on small-group dynamics differs from many important characterizations and studies of national security
and foreign policy decision-making which focus on a unitary actor (see, for example, Brams, 2003, 2011; Bueno de
Mesquita, 1981; Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman, 1992).
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Symptoms of Polythink
There are a number of important symptoms of Polythink, some of which (confusion, leaks, and
framing) are counterintuitive. The presence of these symptoms and pathologies can be used as a diag-
nostic criterion to determine if Polythink was present in a given decision-making unit on a particular
decision problem.
Greater likelihood for intragroup conflict. As group members have different, sometimes opposing
or even zero-sum views of the situation and of potential solutions, there is greater likelihood for group
conflict and personal disagreements in Polythink. This is in comparison with Groupthink, where group
members share common viewpoints. Group conflict may become particularly problematic in long-term
planning and implementation, where policy decisions have lasting impact (e.g., there is a large
“shadow of the future”), and smaller implementation decisions must be continually made and updated.
As an example for this symptom of Polythink, in the case of the 9/11 fiasco, the destructiveness
of this internal conflict to the decision-making process was clear. Chronic disagreement between key
branches of the advisory group often impeded successful cooperation on policy development. This
bickering demonstrated that indeed, “turf is a powerful thing in Washington” (Clarke, 2004, p. 194),
and it often triggered power struggles between the CIA, the FBI, and the military, as the “competing
power centers. . .jockey[ed] for influence over counterterrorism policy” (Shultz, 2004, p. 33).3
Greater likelihood of leaks. Since group members do not hold uniform views of the decision
problem or potential solutions under Polythink, they are more likely to leak information in order to
undermine positions they oppose than in a Groupthink situation.
Perhaps the most famous example of leaking negative stories to the press was General Stanley
McChrystal’s Rolling Stone interview during the first Obama Administration, in which he and his advi-
sors expressed derisive opinions about Vice President Joe Biden, Special Advisor on Afghanistan Rich-
ard Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, and even President Obama himself (Hastings, 2010).4
Confusion and lack of communication. Polythink may increase confusion through willful lack of
communication, mixed messages sent from different members of the decision-making unit, as well as
inadvertent failures to effectively communicate between and within a diverse decision-making struc-
ture. This is likely to confuse the decision-maker and make him or her less clear on the optimal course
of action.
As an example for this symptom of Polythink, a major government failure in the months and
years leading up to the 9/11 attacks was the oft-cited inability of various key agencies to communicate
with each other. And, in fact, analysts often bemoan the fact that “somewhere in CIA there was infor-
mation that two known al Qaeda terrorists had come into the United States. . .Somewhere in FBI there
was information that strange things had been going on at flight schools in the United States”
(Clarke, 2004, p. 236), yet no one was able to pull these threads of information together to form a
Figure 1. Groupthink-Polythink continuum.
3 The national security policies put in place in the months and years leading up to the 9/11 attacks are discussed at
length in Chapter 3 of The Polythink Syndrome (2016).
4 The Afghanistan Withdrawal is examined in Chapter 4 of The Polythink Syndrome.
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complete picture of the impending threat, due to the inability and lack of will of various agencies to
share what they knew (Freeh, 2005).
Greater likelihood of framing effects. Polythink may cause some group members to advance
biased or selective information to effectively make their point and convince the leader of the efficacy
of their ideas (at the expense of others). For example, advisors are likely to frame policies they prefer
in favorable lights (“spreading democracy”) and those they do not in negative lights (“a potential
quagmire”).5 The likelihood of members of the group framing a decision problem in opposite direc-
tions is greater under Polythink than when there is a group consensus, as in Groupthink. Of course, in
Groupthink, framing effects will also be present; however, the frames will tend to be in a single direc-
tion rather than in competing ones.6
As an example of this symptom, the 2012 U.S. debate over the potential arming of the Syrian reb-
els demonstrates the role of frames in Polythink debates. The close political aides on Obama’s side
(against increased involvement in the Syrian conflict) often framed discussion on this issue in terms of
the costs of the United States intervening in Syria, while downplaying the many risks associated with
not intervening (Rohde & Strobel, 2014). These advisors emphasized the large amount of weapons
already on the ground in Syria and the risk they posed of ending up in extremists’ hands (Entous,
2013). In contrast, others such as CIA Director General Petreaus framed the decision in loss terms—
the potential loss of the hard-fought gains of the Iraq War as extremists from the Syria conflict spilled
over into neighboring countries and the need to intervene to prevent this (Entous, 2013).7
Adoption of positions with the lowest common denominator. Because of the many competing voi-
ces and ideas, Polythink may create decision situations in which the lowest common denominator
becomes the dominant output of the group. Since group members express different or opposing views
as to the best potential solutions to a given policy problem, there is less likelihood for the group to
“speak in one voice” under Polythink. As such, groups will likely settle on a compromise option that
attempts to partially satisfy all (most) parties. As such, each member of the group needs to make some
concessions or compromises in his or her organizational and political agendas in order to reach a pol-
icy decision that will be palatable to the majority of the group (a difficult hurdle). More powerful
groups within the decision unit may also marginalize or even expel members of groups with compet-
ing perspectives, thereby imposing their particular views on the decision unit.8
An example of this symptom of Polythink are decisions on the pace of the Iraq War drawdown.
In essence, there were two main plans on the table for withdrawing troops from Iraq: the 23-month
drawdown plan from the military that Obama had inherited from his military commanders and his 16-
month campaign promise. The 19-month timeline for troop withdrawals that was eventually chosen
essentially “split the difference between the sixteen months he promised as a candidate and the
twenty-three-month timeline favored by some commanders” (Bruno, 2009). Thus, it was chosen
mainly due to its ability to “balance” between various viewpoints, rather than because it was necessar-
ily the optimal diplomatic or military strategy (Bruno, 2009).9
Decision paralysis. Often, groups may not even be able to reach a lowest common denominator
decision and may instead suffer from complete decision paralysis. This can result in the failure to act
to stem or to prevent potential crises or to the adoption of suboptimal, satisficing policies that are often
5 Unless the persuasiveness and influence of each group member is equal, these frames are unlikely to completely can-
cel out.
6 This conception of framing is in line with the well-known discussion of framing effects in Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979). While Tversky and Kahneman point to a “loss” or “gain” frame, our use of the term here implies other poten-
tial frames as well. For example, the same issue can be framed as a “security problem” or as a “diplomatic problem”
with all the requisite differences in approach and issues that those competing frames imply.
7 See Chapter 7 of The Polythink Syndrome.
8 Such was the case with the neo-conservative coalition in George W. Bush’s administration and the ostracism and
eventual resignation of Colin Powell.
9 See Chapter 5 of The Polythink Syndrome.
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short-sighted and inhibit the long-term planning required in many foreign policy decisions. The many
divergent viewpoints present within the decision-making unit under Polythink can cause leaders to
freeze up, as they are both unclear as to whether their choice is correct and if it could even be accepted
by the rest of their decision-making units and their public. The political costs of reaching a decision
may also simply be too high, given the dissent in their own decision unit. Thus, decision paralysis is a
primary outcome (e.g., result) of Polythink.
The Obama Administration’s 2009 major shift on Iran—from promised engagement on the cam-
paign trail to quick containment once in office—is a primary illustration of this symptom. Essentially, in
containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions in 2009, the Obama Administration faced a situation with few good
options and even fewer options for which consensus could be gained domestically and internationally.
There was deep contention over the question of “when to talk, with whom and about what” (Murray,
2010, p. 217). Thus, “Cold War-style containment emerged as the default option for the United States”
(Adamsky, 2011, p. 168), not because it was necessarily the most effective policy but because it repre-
sented the continuation of existing policy towards Iran at a time when achieving the necessary consensus
for a new (and perhaps, better) policy proved too intractable. The administration was paralyzed in terms
of its ability to develop new policies, and so it continued with the existing one, essentially delaying a
decision until more consensus could be reached. However, in Obama’s second term, his new restruc-
tured decision unit was able to push forward a new diplomatic policy vis-a-vis Iran. Parallel changes in
Iran’s decision unit (e.g., Rouhani’s rise to power) were also instrumental, of course.
Paradoxically, some of the symptoms of Polythink are similar to those of Groupthink. However,
this is the case not because the group is thinking alike or sharing the same views but “because the
group is failing to carry out any significant collective thinking” (Mintz et al., 2005, p. 8). As is the
case with Groupthink, Polythink is likely to lead to the following:
Limited review of policy options. Polythink can actually lead to a limited review of policy options
even though each advisor has distinct policy preferences that should lead to a widening of the policy
options considered. This is because the debate within the group can quickly become unwieldy. Thus,
decision-makers will often quickly exclude some options from consideration in order to be presented
with a more manageable choice set for more thorough consideration (Mintz, 2004).
No room for reappraisal of previously rejected policy options. Similarly, as in Groupthink, the group
is less likely to revise its policies if and when other policy options are brought back up for discussion.
Unlike in Groupthink, this is not because of overwhelming group consensus that impedes the processing
of new information, but because any updating of policies may result in the time-consuming rehashing of
previously reconciled disagreements between group members that the leader wishes to avoid.
As these many symptoms demonstrate, Polythink, like Groupthink, is likely to lead to defective,
suboptimal decisions; however, the mechanism for these flawed decision-making processes is the
group’s disunity and diversity rather than the group’s unity and conformity.
Measuring Polythink
Polythink can be operationalized and measured (Mintz, Mishal, & Morag, 2005). In addition to
examining the number and severity of the above symptoms present in a decision-making process, one
can determine empirically whether Polythink or Groupthink exists in a group by examining the num-
ber of overlapping choice sets of alternatives and dimension sets of group members (Mintz et al.,
2005). Such an analysis can reveal the extent of overlap in individuals’ “decision matrices” (Mintz
et al., 2005). A decision matrix consists of a set of decision alternatives (for example, Do Nothing,
Apply Sanctions, Negotiate, Attack) and a set of decision dimensions or criteria (such as political
considerations, diplomatic considerations, military dimensions, and economic considerations)
(Mintz, 1993). By comparing whether the alternative sets and dimension sets are (1) completely
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identical, (2) partially similar, or, (3) whether there is little overlap in the choice sets and the dimen-
sion sets, one can determine whether a Polythink or a Groupthink dynamic exists in a group. Concep-
tually and empirically, it is thus possible to think about decision units in several different ways. These
have important ramifications for the operationalization and measurement of Polythink.
1. The content of the choice set and dimension set: This refers to whether alternatives and
dimensions of group members are similar or different and the extent of such variations
across group members.
2. Binary (bi-categorical) mode of decision-making versus multicategorical mode: In for-
eign policy, for example, state decision-makers evaluate alternatives such as use of force
or no use of force; sponsor terrorism or oppose terrorism; or in a multicategorical mode
(e.g., attack, do not attack, negotiate, apply sanctions). One measure of Polythink is the
number of alternatives in the choice set of each decision-maker.
3. One can view decision-making as multidimensional (based on several criteria/dimensions
such as the military balance, political audience costs, or deterrence) versus uni-dimensional
(e.g., whether the decision will help the leader politically). Consequently, another measure
of Polythink is the number of dimensions/criteria in each member’s matrix.
4. The size of the decision matrix is also an important criterion in comparing decision-making
(Maoz, 1990). Some decision-makers conceptualize a decision problem in a relatively nar-
row way, while others do so in a more comprehensive and more encompassing way (e.g., by
using a multicategorical choice set and a multidimensional dimension set). The size of the
decision matrix equals the number of alternatives multiplied by the number of dimensions.
In discussing the measurement of Polythink, it is important to also think of how its presence can
be refuted. In order for the Polythink syndrome and dynamic to exist, several symptoms, such as
leaks, competing framing efforts, and intragroup conflict should also be present. Polythink is not only
multiple viewpoints among group members, which might be normal for any group; disagreement and
dissent are critical as well. For example, Polythink appears to have been prevalent at the 2000 Israeli-
Palestinian Camp David talks. In a documentary that aired on Channel 10’s “The Source” with Raviv
Drucker in Israel in November 2015, Saeb Erekat claimed that the Israeli delegation was divided and
fragmented, even mentioning specific names of delegates and how their views broke down into differ-
ent subgroups within the Israeli delegation.
Indeed, one way to distinguish Polythink from Groupthink is by showing that the group has seri-
ous disagreements among its members. It is also possible to refute Polythink by showing that the
group dynamic fits better with Groupthink symptoms. The overarching prerequisite of Polythink is the
plurality of opinions, disagreement, and dissent among group members. Moreover, for Polythink to
exist, the majority of symptoms (although not all) need to be present. The symptoms of Polythink
thus offer a systematic and testable set of hypotheses. For example, groups under Polythink will likely
exhibit more intragroup conflict, leaks, and confusion than Groupthink groups.10
Causes of Polythink
But why does Polythink occur in the first place?11 The underlying causes of Polythink boil down
to a few key factors. First, the large bureaucracy that characterizes many organizations (not just
10 There are some exceptions to this; for example, groups that operate in secret (e.g., intelligence units) forbid leaks, yet
are often still characterized by Polythink.
11 Much of this section is adapted from Mintz et al. (2005).
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governmental) means that diverse sets of decision-makers must work together to develop cohe-
sive, beneficial policies while at the same time effectively represent their various constituencies
(such as political parties, governmental branches, and respective institutions). Moreover, this
same complex bureaucratic structure can often lead to a lack of communication flow that severely
impedes the timely, uniform information processing necessary to make expedient, informed deci-
sions. Finally, at a more individual level, members of a decision-making group bring with them
vastly different types of decision-making styles, experience, and roles within the group. These
diverse perspectives and ways of making decisions hinder the ability of individual group members
to see eye-to-eye on important issues. These causes of Polythink can be summarized in five key
explanations:
The Institutional, “Turf Wars” Explanation. The well-known phrase “where you stand depends
on where you sit,” coined by Rufus Miles Jr. (1949, 1978) and popularized by Graham Allison
(1971), adeptly summarizes the type of “institutional thinking” that can contribute to Polythink. Under
this explanation, the goal of members of the group is to represent their bureaucracy/organization.
Thus, presidential advisors, members of the military, intelligence officials, and cabinet members all
have their own institutional perspectives and views and interpret and advance plans and proposals
from these particular “lenses” and calculations12 (e.g., political, coalitionary, institutional, etc.). This
well-known tendency to negotiate between various institutional positions is evident in Kissinger’s
famed observation that “The conclusions of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security
Council reflect the attainable consensus among sovereign departments rather than a sense of direction”
(Kissinger, 1969, p. 227).
Institutional rivalries can contribute to Polythink. Due to intragroup and intergroup institutional
competition (for resources, attention, time, credit, promotion), turf battles can arise that hamper infor-
mation sharing across a variety of intelligence and security agencies, such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA,
triggering confusion and miscommunication, key symptoms of Polythink. Moreover, multiple gate-
keepers at various organizations may emerge, holding information at control or choke points (Sulli-
van, 2007) and keeping the information close to their chest (for a variety of organizational and
bureaucratic reasons) instead of sharing it.
The Political Explanation. Robert Putnam (1988) coined the term “Two-Level Games” to
describe a typical negotiation setting where negotiators “play” at both the international level and
the domestic level. As such, they take into account international considerations as well as domes-
tic political considerations (such as political audience costs; see Schultz, 2003). Audiences play
an important part in shaping the behavior of elected officials (Rubin & Brown, 1975). In parlia-
mentary democracies, for example, where governments typically consist of representatives of dif-
ferent parties with different platforms, agendas, constituencies, and interests, a two-level game
can contribute to Polythink, as each member of the group represents not only the national interest
but also his party and constituencies’ interests. Each member of the decision unit has to view his
strategy in light of the coalition process and its potential effect on the relationship with different
potential partners. Indeed, actors may evaluate a policy choice entirely in terms of how it affects
another policy choice or political conflict that is more important to them. This lack of strong
group cohesion (because group members come from different political parties or represent differ-
ent political constituencies) can increase the likelihood of Polythink. In contrast, authoritarian
systems are less likely to suffer from Polythink because of the top-down control and fear advisors
have of giving dissenting opinions.
12 In the business world, various issue positions can be advanced by marketing and sales representatives, financial man-
agers, and R&D managers. Such diversity is common and reflects Polythink in many corporate and business
structures.
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The Normative Explanation. Another cause of Polythink is individual, rather than structural.
Members of a decision unit can possess different decision-making styles (e.g., such as need for cogni-
tion or cognitive complexity), interpersonal relationships (collegial, competitive, distant), and beliefs
and worldviews (their operational codes or political ideologies). Steven Walker and associates (1999)
analyzed presidential “operational codes” (George, 1969) and belief systems, and have pointed to the
importance of normative differences in beliefs among leaders in predicting decisions and action.
These operational codes and normative perspectives also apply to presidential advisors. Members of
groups represent not only the national interest but also their personal values and worldviews. Moreover,
they have different personal backgrounds inside and outside of government, growing up and throughout
their careers. The relative lack of formal “rules of the game” in presidential advisory groups can exacer-
bate these differences and contribute to “Normative Thinking”—where the goal of members of the
decision-making unit is to represent their own world view and normative belief system (Taber, 1992).
The Expert/Novice Explanation. Fiske, Kinder, and Larter (1983) found that novices “employ
knowledge-based strategies that differ from those of experts” (p. 393). They process information and
recall information in different ways than experts. Specifically, whereas experts often focus on discon-
firming evidence and information, novices typically focus on confirmatory information and strategies
(Fiske et al., 1983). Naturally, this can have a drastic effect on the prevalence of Polythink. In national
security and foreign policy decision-making units, this expert-novice divide generally exists between
security experts, diplomatic experts, and political experts, who, given the tendency to specialize, are
most likely novices in the others’ field of expertise (i.e., a career diplomat will likely not have a strong
military background, and a military leader will likely not have trained as a diplomat, etc.). This divide
can thus be particularly pronounced when military leaders weigh in on diplomatic solutions and when
diplomatic advisors seek to address military concerns. New leaders or advisors may also suffer from
an expertise gap that leads to different modes of thinking.
Importantly, however, though experts do indeed use different decision-making strategies than novi-
ces, expertise does not always lead to better decision-making. Psychological and decision-science
research has often demonstrated that, surprisingly, experts are frequently little better than chance at pre-
dicting or forecasting events (Tetlock, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Moreover, novices are able
to make accurate and efficient decisions when the judgments required are novel or innovative (Jervis,
1976). This means that expertise is often “functional if the environment is stable but has high costs if it
is not” (p. 196)—a paradox that has important implications for both policymaking and its execution.
For example, it was not military experts who predicted the changing nature of war in the years prior to
the First World War, but “amateurs—novelists and a Polish banker,” demonstrating that, within the
military at least, major innovations often come from outside the mainstream of the field (p. 199).
The Leader/Followers Explanation. Finally, studies have shown that leaders place significant
constraints on the freedom of action of their advisors (Hermann, 2001). The inability of leaders to
often share goals, objectives, or strategies with group members, due to fear of leaks or the desire to
maintain impartiality and prevent Groupthink, may also contribute to Polythink. For example, a
“hands off” management style that gives subordinates a wide degree of autonomy may contribute to
Polythink by exacerbating each group member’s perceived independence and influence.
In sum, the above discussion would seem to suggest that bureaucracies, constituencies, affiliations,
worldviews, and relative expertise all exert a significant influence on the underlying dynamic of a
decision-making unit. Collective considerations have to compete in the mind of each member of the
team with other interest-based considerations (institutional, domestic-political, and personal) (Mintz
et al., 2005).13 Thus, the existence of Polythink can be thought of as a contingent phenomenon—
13 The five causes of Polythink listed above are not mutually exclusive. There is a natural overlap between some of these
considerations. For example, the political positions of members of the coalition and their personal worldviews are
related constructs that often interact.
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dependent on a variety of factors such as government structure (e.g., parliamentary vs. presidential) and
advisory group structure (competitive vs. collegial). Thus, contextual variables such as the level of con-
troversy surrounding an issue, a fragmented political system, and conflicting bureaucratic, institutional,
and political agendas and interests of group members are likely to increase the probability of Polythink.
Leadership style is also critical in impacting the group dynamics, as it affects the way advisory
systems are structured, organized, and engineered (Hermann & Preston, 1994). Margaret Hermann
(2001) produced a typology of leadership styles consisting of four categories: crusader, strategic, prag-
matic, and opportunistic. We believe this typology can also help predict Polythink and whether this
Polythink will be productive or destructive. The crusader challenges political constraints and is closed
to new information (Hermann, 2001). The opportunistic leader, in contrast, “is mindful of political
constraints and pursues information” (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 117). This type of leader will not
risk alienating politically important actors. The strategic leader “challenges constraints but is open to
information” (p. 117). This leader is bold politically “but circumspect when it comes to acting out
these ambitious aspirations” (p. 117). Finally, the pragmatic leader respects political constraints but is
closed to information. Which type of leadership style can best predict Polythink? It is clear that a pre-
requisite for productive Polythink is openness to information from group members, even if the infor-
mation they provide contradicts the one the leader seeks. Consequently, the pragmatic leader and the
opportunistic one are more likely to benefit from Polythink, whereas the crusader and strategist may
either ignore divisions within their advisory system or even forbid such divisions.
The composition of the decision unit making decisions, the group dynamics within this unit, and
the relationship between the decision unit and other groups affect the choices it makes. Understanding
these dynamics is crucial to explaining, predicting, and improving national security and foreign policy
decisions, business and corporate decisions, and individual decisions.
Table 1 classifies cases of U.S. foreign policy since early 2001, according to their dominant-
group decision dynamic.
Can Polythink Be Beneficial? The Productive Polythink Dynamic
Polythink often leads to decision paralysis and poor decisions. However, under what conditions
might Polythink result in good decisions? In other words, how can Polythink be beneficial? At the
extreme, Polythink could be irreversible (i.e., a badly fragmented group cannot be applied toward a
positive purpose because the degree of combativeness creates irreversibly negative effects). However,
in many cases, political officials/business executives/managers/other group leaders can benefit from
Polythink if they can leverage positively the plurality of opinions presented to them in a group setting
en route to forming a decision. For example, if a leader can take the diverse feedback of group mem-
bers and channel it into one comprehensive viewpoint, articulated in one unified voice, it may actually
be beneficial to have diverse input in the decision.
There are obviously examples of decisions where diverse opinions/visions were reconciled and
resulted in a positive policy outcome. For example, regardless of how individuals judge the actual out-
come of the Surge, the decision on the surge of U.S. forces in Iraq is a prime example of how the
Administration consulted with multiple groups and experts to engage in a relatively balanced
decision-making process in terms of evaluating multiple, even conflicting, views and reconciling
them to formulate a cohesive policy. Likewise, President Obama’s decision to draw down the number
of troops in Iraq exhibited some serious disagreements, but it was supported by nearly 75% of the
U.S. electorate (Jones, 2014), who considered it better than the status quo outcome—at least at the
time the decision was taken (though this view is increasingly being challenged as ISIS emerges as a
major threat in Iraq and Syria). Stated differently, divergent opinions do not always lead to a bad
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decision. Managed, Productive Polythink can even be beneficial to the decision-maker as it could
reduce the biases of individual group members, as we explain below.
One way that Polythink—channeled effectively—can be beneficial to a decision-maker is reduc-
ing biases of information processing, judgment, and choice in group settings. Cognitive biases are
defined as “predictable errors in the ways that individuals interpret information and make decisions”
(Kahneman & Renshon, 2009, p. 79). Scholars of decision-making under risk have detected several
common biases in decision-making (Forman & Selly, 1996; Jervis, 1976; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010)
that Polythink may help prevent. This is not the case with Groupthink, which raises the likelihood for
a group to exhibit many of these cognitive and information processing biases. Interestingly, many of
these cognitive biases are more “hawkish”-oriented in that they make decision-makers “not only more
likely to see threats as more dire than an objective observer would perceive, but also likely to act in a
way that will produce unnecessary conflict” (Kahneman & Renshon, 2009, p. 79). Some of the more
well-known biases include:
1. Shooting from the hip. This entails making spur of the moment, unplanned decisions.
Since group members in a Polythink dynamic express a plurality of opinions, including
dissenting views, it is less likely that the group as a whole will be able to make a shoot-
from-the-hip decision. Group members who have opposing views are simply more likely
than in a Groupthink setting to introduce such views and challenge the prevailing one,
making it hard, all things being equal, for the group leader to make impulsive decisions.
2. Locking in. “Locking in” is focusing exclusively on a preferred policy option while
ignoring critical information that contradicts this policy option. This bias is much more
likely to occur in a Groupthink setting than in a Polythink dynamic. This is because in
Polythink, there is a plurality of opinions and views that reduces the probability of all
group members to share and advocate the same policy option. With Polythink, there is a
greater probability of at least some dissent among group members, including the intro-
duction of an alternative course of action or even a set of competing alternatives.
3. Wishful thinking. Though some views within a Polythink group may represent wishful
thinking, other views are likely to not exhibit such bias. Consequently, compared with
Groupthink, there is less likelihood for wishful thinking when people express (and are
thus exposed to) multiple views than when they share the same (e.g., wrong) view.
Table 1. Groupthink and Polythink in American Foreign Policy
GROUPTHINK POLYTHINK
Pre-9/11 Security Policy
Entry into Afghanistan War
Exit from Afghanistan War
Entry into Iraq War
Exit from Iraq War
2009 Iran Sanctions
2012 Syria Sanctions
2013–14 Kerry Peace Process in the Middle East
2014 U.S. Decision to Attack ISIS
Tactical Issues Surrounding 2014 U.S. Decision to Attack ISIS
Source: These cases are analyzed in Mintz and Wayne (2016).
Note. These cases represent significant American foreign policy decisions in the Middle East since the 9/11 attacks, an
area of tremendous strategic interest and policy importance for the United States and the world. Importantly, in assessing
the presence of Groupthink or Polythink in these decisions, the quality of the outcome is less relevant than the process
and dynamic of the decision itself. We thus do not make normative claims regarding the relative correctness of the pol-
icy chosen, only of the decision-making process behind this choice.
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4. Ignoring critical information. In a Polythink dynamic, group members are also less likely
to ignore critical information compared with the Groupthink dynamic. This is because the
diverse group is more likely to point to, or even highlight, some obstacles and challenges
to the preferred course of action. However, because members of the group suffer from a
Polythink syndrome, their collective view may be more radical than the view of each one
of them, a phenomenon known in the psychological literature as Risky Shift (or group
polarization effect). This may lead to the radicalization of the group’s recommendation.
5. The poliheuristic bias. This bias refers to when decisions are made only following the
elimination of options that are particularly negative on a singular noncompensatory dimen-
sion (usually political calculations; Mintz, 2004). The poliheuristic bias is less likely to
occur in a Polythink dynamic because conflicting political and institutional agendas and
interests often neutralize each other in the process. In other words, group members have
diverse opinions in a Polythink setting, so while some members may be susceptible to a
poliheuristic bias, the group itself may actually be less prone to such a bias.
6. Focusing on short-term benefits rather than on long-term costs. In a Polythink environ-
ment, it is more likely that some members will focus on short-term gains whereas others
will focus on long-term costs than in Groupthink where the group is more homogenous
in its position and opinion. This can be beneficial to the decision-maker.
7. Preference over preference. Closely related to the “Lock In” bias is the “Preference over
Preference” bias of group members. This bias, whereby one overarching course of action
is already preferred (e.g., “military action”), but the preference ordering of the subop-
tions is unclear (e.g., “ground forces” or “missile attacks”), is more likely to occur in a
Groupthink process with a directive leader than in a Polythink process. This is because
divergent opinions represent a plurality of preferences. Such overarching preferences
govern the decision and ultimate choice.
8. Overconfidence. The group as a whole may be less susceptible to overconfidence bias or
“positive illusions” (Kahneman & Renshon, 2009) as various members of the group who
exhibit more opposing views may cancel/neutralize each other in overconfidence and
underconfidence. In fact, the plurality of viewpoints may hinder overconfidence, as for
many of the views presented there is a counterargument and an opposing view.
Engineering Productive Polythink
Polythink is thus, in many ways, a double-edged sword. Given the ability of Polythink to attenuate
several biases in decision-making (as highlighted above), Polythink has the potential to be beneficial to
a decision-maker, if channeled effectively. However, the existence of Polythink symptoms in groups
typically means group conflict, confusion, leaks, selective information processing, framing and counter-
framing, and suboptimal, lowest-common-denominator decisions. Turning Polythink into an asset in
decision-making is, therefore, challenging, as one needs to overcome its negative symptoms and conse-
quences. Though “it is a Washington truism that every White House likes Cabinet consensus and hates
dissent” (Ignatius, 2013), dissent in any group (and especially in Washington) is common. How can
Polythink lead to high-quality decisions? Can a “clever” choice architecture that is built around Poly-
think lead to good decisions? How might an executive or leader turn Polythink into an asset rather than
a liability? Under what conditions of Polythink can the quality of decision-making actually improve?
In this section, we show how the presence of Polythink might be converted from a harmful to
helpful feature in the context of collective decision-making and suggest five ways that a leader might
use to accomplish this, providing some examples to illustrate how this was achieved in the past by
U.S. presidents.
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Design and Successfully Manage Your Decision Unit
The key to overcoming Polythink and Groupthink lies in the concept of Decision Unit Engineer-
ing. Decisions are shaped and influenced by the composition of the Decision Unit (DU) (Russett,
Starr, & Kinsella, 2006). As such, executives in business, politics, domestic policymaking, foreign
policy, national security, and other domains need to carefully compose the decision unit in advisory
groups to ensure high-quality decisions. Other things being equal, a quality process is likely to lead to
better decisions than a nonsystematic, intuitive, unstructured process.
There is plenty of historical evidence that shows that poor decision-making processes lead to
poor decisions. However, there are numerous historical and contemporary examples and case studies
that show that this is not always the case and that a more organized decision-making process does not
always lead to a “better” decision.
The classic example that “good, systematic processes do not necessarily lead to good decisions”
is, of course, the series of decisions made by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and the
Pentagon during the Vietnam War. Many have claimed that McNamara’s decisions before, during,
and towards the end of the war were made carefully and systematically. Yet, this led to a bad out-
come—a foreign policy fiasco: American and Vietnamese casualties were heavy, and the end result,
the Vietnam syndrome, was a failure, from the point of view of the U.S. administration, the mass pub-
lic, and the South Vietnamese government.
The first recommendation we offer for productive Polythink, to enhance the likelihood of suc-
cessful group decisions, is to focus on the Decision Unit Architecture when initially forming advisory
units. Policymakers should try to think of the policies and solutions they want to achieve and imple-
ment down the road and design their Decision Unit to meet these goals. This should be done prefera-
bly in a balanced decision mode, where there can be “healthy” divergent perspectives among group
members but a general consensus on policy goals and overall direction of the group. An ideal
decision-unit structure would be balanced, with some diversity of opinions but overall consensus on
strategic goals and agenda. This balance can be thought of as “Con-Div” dynamic, with some conver-
gence and some divergence of opinions (see Mintz & Wayne, 2016).
Indeed, functional decision units are often governed by group decision rules (Hermann, 2001). If
such groups do not use rules such as deciding by majority or unanimity in decision-making, or by sim-
ply following the leader or another decision rule, it can lead to chaos. The more established these rules
are, the more stable the decision unit.
One intriguing example of Decision Unit engineering can be found in the deliberate construction
of President Obama’s second-term team. One of the characteristics of this advisory group is its more
unified worldviews including group members’ conception and view of limitations of American mili-
tary power than the more diverse “team of rivals” group that characterized Obama’s first term. Many
analysts viewed this as a deliberate move by the President, a result of the discord he faced in his first
term in office amongst his cabinet members. It was predicted early on in the second term of the Presi-
dent that the new team would have a top-down consensus (Ignatius, 2013). And indeed, in the second
term, the Obama Administration has often been critiqued as veering further and further into the realm
of Groupthink as Obama loyalists gain influence in the decision-making unit. Obviously, the composi-
tion and dynamic of advisory groups to the President are likely to have implications on U.S. foreign
policy and national security decisions.14
14 Thus, for example, during Jimmy Carter’s term as President of the United States, then secretary of State Cyrus Vance
and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski had very different views and philosophy on how U.S. foreign pol-
icy and national security should be conducted. And during the Nixon presidency, the president’s national security
advisor, Henry Kissinger, and Nixon’s Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, often clashed on policy direction, issues,
and influence.
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Leverage Polythink in Brainstorming
Polythink can be very beneficial to decision-makers in brainstorming. One of the key principles of
brainstorming is taking advantage of diverse viewpoints to consider a wide array of options before arriv-
ing at a good choice. The decision-maker is given the ability to deliberate the pros and cons of various
policy options. Thus, Polythink can prove useful and constructive in brainstorming. For example, lead-
ers of a group and other key decision-makers can ask group members for their advice and input and use
this information to brainstorm about potential consequences and optimal courses of action, plans, and
solutions. Leaders can also have advisors utilize “good cop, bad cop” roles, which can also be helpful
when the team must negotiate with other states or regimes. More analytic and technology-savvy leaders
can even ask group members to construct decision matrices (with or without the use of the Decision
Board software) and compare these individual matrices to identify similarities and differences, with the
ultimate goal of evaluating a comprehensive decision matrix that represents such diverse views. When
Polythink is evident, the group leader can also subdivide the group into small subgroups who can each
present the subgroup’s view. These will be discussed by various subgroups and elevated to the next level
of discussion. They can be consolidated eventually into a group decision. In practice, establishing joint
policy desks for sharing and analyzing information originating from a variety of sources (e.g., various
intelligence agencies) is another way to reduce Polythink in a group.
Use Polythink as a Divide and Conquer Tactic
In some situations, where Polythink is evident in a group, leaders can actually exploit and lever-
age the Polythink dynamic for their benefit.15,16 For instance, it might be useful for leaders if the opin-
ions of group members in an advisory group are diverse, as this might enable the leader to have more
freedom of choice among those opinions. This is because there are supporters in the group for the var-
ious different policies they propose (Janice Stein, personal communication, 2012). In other words,
Polythink divisions among group members can paradoxically provide leaders with more flexibility
than the homogenous Groupthink view, for example, if the group promotes an opinion which contra-
dicts the view of its leader. In the decision to rescue the U.S. hostages from Iran, President Carter
made the decision to pursue the military option while keeping Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who
opposed the mission, out of the loop. The president relied on the advice of others in the advisory unit.
Recently, in the Geneva negotiations of the G5 1 1 with Iran in November 2014 regarding its
nuclear program, a plurality of opinions and disagreement was apparent. This kind of dissent can para-
doxically legitimize the ultimate decision, as the public sees that even conflicting and challenging
opinions were taken into account in making the decision.
Use Polythink to Subdivide Major Policy Issue into Smaller,
More Manageable Decision Problems
Group leaders can leverage the expertise and knowledge of group members in different policy
areas and domains to help shape their own decisions. For example, President Bush leveraged the
expertise of various think tanks in Washington DC and experts in Congress in his decision on the
Surge in Iraq. While the President did not end up taking the advice of all groups and think tanks, he
benefited from their diverse viewpoints. There are at least two reasons it is important for the chief
executive to listen to diverse opinions: (1) the leader/politician can claim credit for instituting and
embracing a bipartisan approach, which is rare in Washington; and (2) by consulting groups that do
not even agree with the policy, the chief executive can often not only coopt opponents, but also pro-
vide political and institutional cover, diffuse responsibility, and reduce the amount of criticism if
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things do not go well and/or as planned. This was apparently the case with Truman’s decision to exe-
cute the nuclear attacks on Japan during World War II (Pinter, 2013).
In the summer of 2013, President Obama turned to Congress to seek authorization for the use of
force against the Assad regime in Syria. As the public and Congress disapproved of such an act, the
President decided to reach an agreement with Russia’s Putin on the removal of chemical weapons from
Syria.
Polythink can also be turned into multiple advocacy if, for example, the group leader transforms
opposing viewpoints into strategic, beneficial input. Multiple advocacy and the so-called “competitive
advisory system” are typically planned in advance by the decision-maker to generate multiple opin-
ions, even devil’s advocacy. Productive Polythink is the ability of the group leader to incorporate
opposing viewpoints into a “good” decision, without a priori planning or soliciting such advice. In
other words, it is making the best out of a potentially detrimental situation.
Use Decision Support Systems for Objective, Polythink-Free Decision-Making
Another method of countering unbalanced, pluralistic decision-making views is through the use
of analytic tools such as a Decision Support System. The use of an objective, computerized system
may be one way of assisting chief executives to avoid Polythink and Groupthink in their decision unit.
One such system is the Decision Board computerized platform developed by Mintz, Geva, Redd, and
Carnes (1997). The benefits of using a Decision Support System (DSS) in group decision-making are:
• The DSS can display a wide range of policy alternatives, including those that the president/
executive may not typically use and policy alternatives that can be viewed as representing
“outside the box” ideas.
• A Decision Support System can take into account a large set of criteria for selecting the
optimal policy for the President. The human mind cannot comprehend and calculate so
many dimensions of a decision without a computerized system that aids the policymaker for-
mulating their decision. This is another advantage of using such systems.
• A Decision Support System enables the president and his advisors (and other group leaders)
to conduct IF-THEN analysis, based on various dynamic and static assumptions and scenar-
ios to determine the optimal outcome of the decision. One cannot expect the president to
actually use DSSs, but the executive’s advisors can and probably should carefully examine
the consequences of a wide range of policy alternatives to determine optimal outcome.
• A Decision Support System can lead to a careful evaluation of alternatives and dimensions
in a comprehensive way, thus overcoming many of the problems associated with the Poly-
think syndrome, biases in information processing, biases in group dynamics and naturally in
individual decision-making. It can also assist the policymaker in organizing alternatives in a
clearer, more controlled manner. In addition, it has the benefit of displaying all the informa-
tion in a systematic way for key decision-makers.
Thus, for example, the use of a Decision Support System by advisors of President Obama during
deliberations on the Iran nuclear issue could have aided the President and his advisors to determine and
decide on “best” policy options to pursue, in a relatively objective, systematic way, while neutralizing
information processing biases and other cognitive biases, even in the chaotic and ever-changing environ-
ment of the Middle East. This may help the chief executive avoid the Polythink and Groupthink syn-
dromes. Of course, some of these strategies are more plausible than others from a practical standpoint
(e.g., it is more likely that a leader can engage in decision unit architecture than that he or she will
actually employ a mechanized DSS).
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The Bottom Line
Polythink and Groupthink are generic concepts that are applicable to a myriad of realms. These
concepts can be applied to a variety of arenas and domains, in domestic, foreign and national security
policymaking, corporate and business decisions, international and domestic organizational decisions
and even personal decisions. For example, Polythink exists widely in business and the corporate world
as well. Indeed, Polythink is applicable to any group decision. Tactics to transform Destructive Poly-
think to Productive Polythink may lead to better outcomes, but this often depends on the leader’s
style, charisma, vision, and the special circumstances of the group. Consider, for instance, the effect
of Polythink or Groupthink on budgetary decisions in business and industry, nonprofit organizations
and at the local, state, or federal level. It is clear that, in government, such small-group dynamics
affect the ultimate choice and allocation and distribution of resources, for example, to national secu-
rity versus social welfare programs—what is known as the “guns” versus “butter” dilemma in budget-
ing. Essentially, Polythink and Groupthink affect decisions whenever there is more than a single
decision-maker. These group dynamics have broad applicability worldwide, beyond the United States,
of course.
Thus, Polythink is essentially a global phenomenon, not confined to one country or to one society
or to a specific governmental system. Transforming Destructive Polythink to Productive Polythink is
key for decision-makers who hope to harness the diversity of their advisory teams to improve the poli-
cymaking process. Engineering the decision unit to follow a balanced structure can steer the decision-
making process away from the “defective” Groupthink and Polythink dynamics and ensure a more
balanced evaluation of policy alternatives en route to “good” decisions.
Alternatives to Polythink
Previous work on group decision-making processes, including presidential advisory systems,
have identified several related, but distinct, concepts relevant to the Polythink dynamic. Below, we
outline various strategies and structures of group decision-making that may directly affect the preva-
lence of Polythink in group decision-making processes.
Multiple Advocacy
Polythink may sound similar to Alexander George’s (1972) conception of “multiple advocacy”—
a decision-making strategy whereby leaders seek to “harness diversity of views and interests in the
interest of rational policymaking” (p. 751). However, Polythink is distinct from this idea, in that multi-
ple advocacy is a type of structured, purposeful Polythink process, in which the leader capitalizes on
the already existing Polythink dynamic to carefully structure and brings together the divergent opin-
ions of group members into a single, cohesive policy direction. Thus, whereas multiple advocacy is a
type of Polythink (a type of productive Polythink), most forms, structures, and variants of Polythink
are not multiple advocacy. Polythink is a by-product of group dynamics that often triggers destructive
consequences, rather than a strategic policy, such as multiple advocacy, that is directed and designed
by a leader for the purpose of making informed foreign policy decisions.
The multiple advocacy model, rather than “discouraging or neutralizing internal disagree-
ments over policy,” would harness this diversity towards productive ends. George relies on a cen-
tralized management model in order to avoid devolving into a nonstructured and unbalanced
debate that could potentially paralyze the decision-making process. However, oftentimes, this
structured style of management is faulty or nonexistent—when the decision-making group does
not agree with the leader, when the leader himself is conflicted, when there are too many
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competing voices, and more. Moreover, multiple advocacy can only work when there is relative
parity in terms of power and persuasive skills among all members of the decision unit. This ideal
is very difficult to reach in practice. Thus, the multiple advocacy model can be construed of as a
type of structured, “ideal” Polythink process, with productive consequences, provided that the
group leader adequately structures, leads, and brings together the divergent opinions of group
members into a single, cohesive policy direction.
Distributed Decision-Making (DDM)
Distributed Decision-Making can be defined as “the design and coordination of connected
decisions” (Schneeweiss, 2003, p. 3); a model whereby there is a set of related decisions which
are distributed across a wide set of organizational decision-makers. Distributed decision-making
constitutes therefore, a related but distinct concept to Polythink. The concept originated in the
study of social movements (Brown & Hosking, 1986; Klandermans, 1988), whose distributed,
web-like leadership structure did not fit into typical centralized models of leadership. In distrib-
uted decision-making, the decisions are not made by one single leader, but rather a series of
smaller, interrelated decisions are made by many individuals within an organization, requiring
some degree of coordination between actors. The decision-makers are related by means of their
organizational roles, which give them full or partial authority and responsibility for certain areas
of the decision domain (Sage, 1991).
Thus, it is clear that Distributed Decision-Making is somewhat related to Polythink in that it
involves a variety of decision-makers making interdependent decisions that require a degree of coordi-
nation in order to be cohesive. However, DDM should be seen more as a potential cause or contribu-
tory factor of Polythink. In other words, if this diffuse policymaking process is not properly managed
by some type of hierarchical leadership at the top, it can easily descend into chaos or paralysis as each
decision-maker inserts their own opinions, values, and worldviews into each of their interrelated deci-
sions, failing to coordinate small decisions into one overarching large policy. Indeed, often in national
security policy, it is possible to witness the way in which Distributed Decision-Making exacerbates
Polythink. The State Department will make decisions on foreign aid and diplomacy work; the Depart-
ment of Defense will work to strengthen homeland security; the CIA will focus on intelligence; and
the army will seek to maintain military gains in the field. However, in the end, each of these decisions
impact the other and must be coordinated up the hierarchical ladder to the president who job it is to
ensure the cohesion of the overall foreign policy picture, controlling the potential negative impact of
the military industrial complex’s distributed nature.
The Competitive Advisory System
The competitive advisory system is another strategy that has often been put forth as a method to
counteract Groupthink (Johnson, 1974). In a competitive advisory system, leaders will ask their advi-
sors to vigorously argue their competing viewpoints in front of the leader rather than shielding him or
her from the messy debate process over various policy options. In this system, the leader will keep his
or her personal views on the issue hidden until late in the process, after a thorough and full-fledged
debate has taken place between the advisors. In this way, the leader can learn the pros and cons of
each strategy and be less likely to ignore potential flaws with a preferred strategy. This is because the
advisors do not know the leader’s preference and are thus less likely to shield negative information
concerning the strategy for professional gain or in the interests of deference. By keeping his or her
views on the issue hidden or neutral until late in the decision-making process, the president is effec-
tively playing “the neutral or honest broker” role himself (Burke, 2005). FDR is a prime example of
this strategy (Pfiffner, 2005).
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In contrast to the Competitive Advisory System, Polythink is more of a reflection of an underly-
ing group dynamic than an explicit choice by the leader to structure his or her advisory system in a
specific way. Thus, similar to the idea of Multiple Advocacy, the Competitive Advisory strategy can
help groups leaning towards the Groupthink end of the spectrum and potentially hurt groups leaning
towards the Polythink end of the spectrum.
In other words, the structure of the leader’s advisory group can play an important role in fostering
a Polythink decision-making dynamic. The decision-making literature typically identifies three main
forms of advisory groups—competitive, collegial, and formal (Burke, 2005; Johnson, 1974; Mitchell,
2005). Each system has the potential to mitigate or exacerbate Polythink (or Groupthink) in different
ways. For example, a collegial style will be more likely to lead to Groupthink due to the close rela-
tionship fostered between the leader and his advisors. The competitive system, on the other hand, may
be more predictive of Polythink in that dissenting views of various group members are freely
expressed, perhaps even leading to group conflict. The formal system may mitigate the risks of both
Groupthink and Polythink by providing a more structured system that guides the advisory and
decision-making process.
Conclusion
In this article, we discussed the Polythink syndrome, symptoms, and explanations. Polythink is
quite common in groups. As a group decision-making model, Polythink can be contrasted with Group-
think. The composition of the decision unit and intragroup dynamic affect the decisions leaders and
other policymakers make. It is safe to say that a Polythink-type group will generate, in many instan-
ces, policy recommendations that are very different than those generated by a group characterized by
Groupthink. Thus, these distinct models of group decision-making lead to different predictions, post-
dictions, and explanations. Indeed, an important future research agenda is to examine paired samples
of case studies with “good” and “bad” outcomes to examine the different group dynamic that was
present in each. Appreciating the importance of group dynamics of the decision unit is important and
leads to predictions that cannot otherwise be reached.
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